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Insiders, Outsiders and Conflicts of Interest 
Ruth Dukes* 
 
If labour law, as Arthurs puts it, ‘takes its purpose, form, and content from the larger 
political economy from which it originates and operates’, what shape does or should 
labour law assume in response to the transformation of the political economy in 
countries of the global North, with the declining prevalence of the postwar model of 
full employment within a formal welfare state regime? Correspondingly, what is the 
proper role to be played by labour law and labour relations institutions in the 
development process within industrialising countries of the global South?1  
 
 
I Introduction 
 
This chapter considers the use made of the notions of conflicts of interest, and of insiders and 
outsiders, in academic and policy discourse regarding labour markets and labour law. It takes 
as its starting point the questions raised by Diamond Ashiagbor concerning the ‘conceptual 
and normative narrative’ of labour law.2 It notes, especially, her forefronting of political 
economy as the source of labour law’s ‘purpose, form, and content’ –  but as something, too, 
which may, in turn, be shaped by the law. (The potentially transformative character of law is 
acknowledged by Ashiagbor, as I understand her, when she asks what shape labour law does 
or should assume today in the global North; what the proper role is to be played by labour 
law and labour relations institutions in the development process in the global South.) The 
argument that I seek to make, with Ashiagbor, is for the importance of the wider political 
economy to understanding labour law, and to assessing the capacity of particular laws and 
institutions to contribute to the attainment of particular policy aims: job creation, decent 
wages and working conditions, economic security for workers and their dependants, the 
reduction of wealth and income inequalities.  
 
                                                          
* School of Law, University of Glasgow 
 
1 D Ashiagbor, Conference Programme: Re-imagining labour law for development: informal work in the global 
North and South (September 2016), citing H Arthurs, ‘Labour Law After Labour’ in B Langille and G Davidov 
(eds), The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2011). 
2 ibid. 
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In order to make this argument, the chapter begins by outlining briefly the 
significance of the notion of conflicts of interest to the foundational narratives of labour law, 
conceptual and normative. (The focus here, as throughout the chapter, is with labour law in 
the industrialised world and, especially, the UK.) It then illustrates the degree of emphasis 
given today by policy makers and commentators to the conflicting interests of different 
workers or groups of workers, observing that conflict between the social classes, in contrast, 
tends now to be underemphasised in both policy and scholarly discourse. It notes that the 
identification of conflicts of interest between workers or groups of workers is closely linked, 
often, to the claim or belief that flexible – ‘free’ – markets benefit all, raising employment 
levels and encouraging economic growth. Labour market segmentation should be addressed, 
so the argument goes, so as to maximise flexibility and ease market access for all.  
 
In the course of this discussion, I seek to argue that approaches which begin from an 
identification of labour market insiders and outsiders can suffer from a number of 
weaknesses, chief among them a tendency to oversimplify complex constellations of 
interests, motivations, strategies, allegiances and collusions. As such, they can tend to 
overstate the incidence and the significance of conflicts of interest between the posited 
groups of workers, insiders and outsiders. Often such approaches adopt the kind of ‘pure 
economic theory’ forms of reasoning that are typical of law and economics scholarship, 
conceiving of markets in the abstract – as functioning according to the same set of rules 
regardless of place and time – and of market actors as purely economically motivated. In 
doing so, they can tend to obscure the role of the state, and of law, in giving specific form to 
labour markets and labour market institutions, and, of course, grossly to underemphasise the 
importance of any interest or value other than an economically rational one. A political 
economy framework, in contrast, allows for questions to be asked of labour markets as they 
are configured within particular localities, drawing scholars’ attention directly to the state and 
to public policy as an expression of struggles between different actors over political 
influence.3 Such a framework allows, importantly, for the impact of particular laws and 
policies to be considered over a period of real time, and not only in the ‘snapshot’ view 
captured by an economic model.4 For these reasons, it allows the questions to be addressed in 
                                                          
3 G Menz, ‘Employers and Migrant Legality: Liberalization of Service Provision, Transnational Posting, and the 
Bifurcation of the European Labour Market’ in C Costello and M Freedland (eds), Migrants at Work: 
Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2015), at 49-50. 
4 J Robinson, ‘Time in Economic Theory’ (1980) 33 Kyklos 219. 
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a much more nuanced way of who benefits and who is disadvantaged by particular labour 
laws and labour market institutions; in what respects they are advantaged or disadvantaged; 
and why that is so.  
 
In the final part of the chapter, I construct a case study of the agricultural sector in 
Scotland. In the context of a discussion of labour market insiders and outsiders, informed by 
the wider themes of this volume, the sector is of particular interest. Using the definitions of 
formality and informality developed by Ashiagbor in the volume’s introduction, we might 
say that the general trend in Scottish agriculture is to greater informality in employment 
relations. On the face of it, the sector could characterised by the existence of a number of 
insider and outsider groups: employees whose terms and conditions are regulated by the 
Scottish Agricultural Wages Board, and casual workers, to whom the relevant rules do not 
apply; local workers, and temporary migrants from within the EU and elsewhere; workers 
employed directly by farmers, and those supplied to the farmers by labour market 
intermediaries or ‘gangmasters’; the documented, and the undocumented. Resisting the easy 
characterisation of these groups as labour market insiders and outsiders, and the implication 
of ‘inter-worker’ conflicts of interest which such characterisation might bring with it, I seek 
instead to understand why it is that workers in the sector are generally low-paid and often ill-
treated: what are the motivations and strategies of employing organisations; why are they 
under such pressure to employ low-wage labour; what is the role of the state in causing or 
failing to address the causes of such pressures? I also attempt to identify the possible 
consequences of amending the existing systems of regulation, and the potentially disastrous 
impact upon the sector of Brexit. 
 
 
II Conflicts of Interest and Labour Law 
 
A. From Traditional Narratives to the Third Way 
 
In early accounts of labour law – those which did the work of first presenting it as a distinct 
and coherent field of study and legal practice – employment relations were understood to be 
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inherently conflictual.5 Relying more or less directly on a Marxist analysis of capitalism, 
scholars understood the interests of the social classes – dependent labour, on the one hand, 
and the owners of capital, on the other – to be distinct and opposed.6 Labour law was 
advocated as a means of empowering the weaker party in the relationship, the worker, so that 
his interests were not routinely subordinated to those of the more powerful employer. The 
goals of labour law were conceived accordingly to include the emancipation of the worker 
and democratisation of the economic sphere. Broadly speaking, the interests of the individual 
worker were understood to be identical with those of dependent labour as a class.7 Conflicts 
of interest arising between workers were regarded, therefore, as largely illusory and, in any 
case, to be greatly ameliorated by systems of collective bargaining that ensured standardised 
wages across sectors and regions.8   
 
For the duration of the trente glorieuses, these were the essential tenets of the 
dominant narrative of labour law. It was not until the 1980s that the narrative was challenged 
quite fundamentally on two fronts, each emphasising in different ways the existence of labour 
market insiders and outsiders, and conflicts of interest between groups of workers. In the first 
instance, scholars of neoclassical economics, Austrian libertarianism, and law and economics 
brought a particular form of economic reasoning to bear on the analysis of employment 
relations, characterising workers and employers alike as rational wealth-maximizers, and 
trade unions as rent-seeking monopolies.9 Employment protection laws and collective 
bargaining were criticised for their propensity to raise the wages of some (ie ‘insiders’) above 
the ‘natural’ market level, causing lower wages or even unemployment elsewhere (ie to 
                                                          
5 Part II of this chapter draws heavily on R Dukes, ‘Conflict and the Crisis in Labour Law: From Weimar to 
Austerity’ in PF Kjaer and N Olsen (eds), Critical Theories of Crisis in Europe (London, New York, Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2016). 
6 Se eg H Sinzheimer, Grundzüge des Arbeitsrechts, 2nd ed, (Jena 1927). On the influence of Marx upon 
Sinzheimer, see O Kahn-Freund, ‘Hugo Sinzheimer’ in R Lewis and J Clark (eds), Labour Law and Politics in 
the Weimar Republic (Oxford, Blackwell, 1981). 
7 In the work of Hugo Sinzheimer, for example, the condition of the individual worker was said to be 
determined by the conditions of the social class of which he was a member, so that any improvement in the 
former was dependent upon an improvement in the latter: H Sinzheimer, ‘Demokratisierung des 
Arbeitsverhältnisses’ (1928) in H Sinzheimer, Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze und 
Reden (Frankfurt, Cologne, Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1976) 121. 
8 See eg H Sinzheimer, ‘Das Rätesystem’, and ‘Die Rätebewegung und Gesellschaftsverfassung’ both in idem, 
Arbeitsrecht und Rechtssoziologie: gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden (Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt, 
Cologne, 1976). 
9 The locus classicus is R Posner, ‘Some Economics of Labor Law’ (1984) 51 University of Chicago Law 
Review 988-1011. See also Lord Wedderburn, ‘Freedom of Association and Philosophies of Labour Law’ 
(1989) 18 Industrial Law Journal 1-38. 
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‘outsiders’). Ultimately, it was argued, protective labour laws and trade unions were 
damaging to the economy and so to the very workers that they were designed to protect. 
Feminist critiques of labour law, meanwhile, were directed at exposing the extent to which 
trade unions and established collective bargaining practices had failed, for many decades, to 
embrace certain categories of worker, including categories that were predominantly or wholly 
populated by women (and/or immigrant) workers. Focused, by their nature, on the 
furtherance of members’ interests, unions routinely regarded the priorities and interests of 
‘non-standard’ workers as marginal, or even contrary to members’ interests. As a result, these 
workers ran the risk of being denied the protections afforded to others by way of the 
collective negotiation of employment terms and conditions.10  
 
Notwithstanding the force of these challenges to the traditional labour law narrative, it 
remained the case that class conflict was still highly visible in the 1980s: picture a line of 
striking miners in the north of England eye to eye with an opposing line of police; a mounted 
policeman, truncheon raised; a roomful of young, male traders popping champagne corks as 
computer screens flash green around them. For the most part, scholars of labour law tended to 
frame their analysis accordingly.11 It was not until the mid-1990s that the influential ‘third 
way’ discourse was developed by the centre left in an effort to transcend ‘old’ divides 
between left and right; to offer instead a vision of a win-win society in which rich and poor 
alike would be better off. In the UK, ‘New’ Labour devised a set of policies and legislative 
initiatives in the field of employment and employment relations which were introduced as 
offering ‘fairness at work’.12 The premise upon which the claim of fairness lay, quite 
explicitly, was that certain kinds of labour laws and legally enforceable standards could 
benefit employees and employers alike, improving the situation of the former while helping 
at the same time to make British businesses and the British economy more competitive. 
‘[F]airness at work and competitiveness go hand in hand … one must reinforce the other. 
That is the cardinal principle’.13 Describing the social policy of the European Union at the 
time, with reference to Karl Polanyi, Colin Crouch spoke of ‘embedded neoliberalism’.14 
                                                          
10 J Conaghan, ‘The Invisibility of Women in Labor-Law – Gender-Neutrality in Model-Building’ 14 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 377-392; J Conaghan, ‘Feminism and Labour Law: Contesting 
the Terrain’ in A Morris and T O’Donnell (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Employment Law (London 1999). 
11 See eg Wedderburn, ‘Freedom of Association’ 
12 UK Government (1998), White Paper, Fairness at Work, Cm 3968. 
13 ibid. 
14 C Crouch, ‘Entrenching neo-liberalism: the current agenda of European social policy’ in N Countouris and M 
Freedland (eds), Resocializing Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 2013). 
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Neo-liberal strategies were pursued, but it was recognised that such strategies should be 
nested or embedded in certain forms of social protection, to gain legitimacy and to ease 
disruptive transitions. So-called ‘flexicurity’ programmes aimed, then, to increase the 
flexibility of action open to employers, especially their ability to dismiss workers, while 
offering those workers ‘security’ in the form of improved opportunities for alternative 
employment and adequate income support during periods of ‘transition’. 
 
During the early 2000s, many scholars of labour law, in the UK as elsewhere, were 
critical of third way policies and legislative initiatives, illustrating how measures which 
purported to benefit both sides of industry in truth served the interests of employers rather 
better than those of the workforce.15 Others, however, glimpsed therein the possibility of a 
new narrative for the field; one which might constitute a convincing alternative to the 
‘deregulation’ orthodoxy of the 1980s.16 Without, of course, simply endorsing government 
policy and legislation uncritically, these scholars felt themselves able to identify within its 
terms a set of objectives that they could approve as setting an appropriate agenda for 
scholarly investigations. In their authoritative history of labour legislation and public policy 
in the years to 2007, for example, Paul Davies and Mark Freedland adopted a framework 
which assessed laws and policies primarily with reference to New Labour’s stated objectives 
of maximising social inclusion and improving the competitiveness of the economy.17 These 
were ‘profoundly important social objectives’, Davies and Freedland suggested, which 
scholars would do well to engage with.18 In the UK and elsewhere, other authors developed a 
line of analysis which sought to make the case for labour law by demonstrating how it served 
to address ‘labour market failures’ or ‘externalities’, or to improve labour market efficiency.19 
On that logic, they were able to argue that certain labour rights and standards could be 
beneficial not only to workers and rights-holders, but to all. 
 
 
B. Crisis, Austerity, and the Politics of Division 
 
                                                          
15 Eg T Novitz and P Skidmore, Fairness at Work (Oxford, Hart, 2001) 
16 R Dukes, The Labour Constitution: the Enduring Idea of Labour Law (Oxford, OUP, 2014) ch 5. 
17 P Davies and M Freedland, Towards a Flexible Labour Market (Oxford 2007). 
18 Davies and Freedland, Towards, 249. 
19 For discussion see RM Fischl, ‘Labor Law, the Left and the Lure of the Market’ (2011) 94 Marquette Law 
Review 947. 
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Where is the fairness, we ask, for the shift-worker, leaving home in the dark hours of 
the early morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of their next-door neighbour 
sleeping off a life on benefits? 
George Osborne, UK Conservative Party Conference, October 2012 
 
For a brief moment in 2008, the financial crisis appeared to reveal the deep-seated nature of 
the conflict of interests between those who (had) benefited from deregulated or ‘lightly’ 
regulated financial markets and those who had not. As a matter of more or less unanimous 
agreement, it seemed, the ostensibly ‘win-win’ strategies of the third way would be 
rethought: more stringent financial regulation would be introduced, bankers’ salaries and 
bonuses reigned in, no longer would we feel quite so ‘intensely relaxed about people getting 
filthy rich’.20 Before such steps could be taken, however, the crisis was quickly recast as one 
of swollen public sectors, over-generous welfare systems and rigid labour markets.21 As 
billions of dollars and Euros were spent by governments on propping up the banks, 
unemployment rates rose, welfare payments were reduced, and legal and institutional 
supports for better-than-minimum terms and conditions of employment were removed.22   
 
In what has since become the mainstream analysis of ‘failing’ labour markets, labour 
market segmentation has routinely been attributed to the existence of market ‘insiders’ and 
‘outsiders’. Insiders are those who enjoy ‘unnaturally’ and, therefore, ‘unfairly’ high wages 
and good working conditions including, importantly, job security; outsiders are those without 
work or in precarious, low-paid work. Often ‘insiders’ are defined simply as those in a 
standard employment relationship (SER), enjoying all the legal protections that are accorded 
to (standard) ‘employees’, while ‘outsiders’ are correspondingly those in non-SER.23 The 
characterisation of labour markets as dually segmented in this way encourages the conclusion 
that conflicts of interest arise – primarily and problematically – not between workers and 
their employers, but between different groups of workers. The logic implied by the diagnosis 
                                                          
20 As Peter Mandelson, a prominent member of Tony Blair’s first Government, stated in 1998 
(https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2012/jan/26/mandelson-people-getting-filthy-rich). 
21 A Supiot, ‘Towards a European Policy on Work’ in N Countouris and M Freedland (eds), Resocializing 
Europe in a Time of Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 2013). 
22 For country by country analysis within the EU see: C Clauwaert and I Schömann, ‘The Crisis and National 
Labour Law Reforms: a Mapping Exercise’, Annex to ETUI Working Paper 2014/4 (Brussels 2014).  
23 V De Stefano, ‘A Tale of Oversimplification and Deregulation: the Mainstream Approach to Labour Market 
Segmentation and Recent Responses to the Crisis in European Countries’ (2014) 43(3) Industrial Law Journal 
253. 
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is that in order to improve the position of the outsiders, the insiders’ rights should be 
weakened or forfeited: it is because the insiders’ terms and conditions are unfairly high that 
those of the outsiders remain low.24   
 
In the context of the financial crisis of 2008 and the ongoing crisis in the Eurozone, 
the EU Commission and its Troika associates have consistently identified dual segmentation 
as a primary cause of failing labour markets, high unemployment levels, and stunted 
economic growth.25 Accordingly they have recommended or required national governments 
to reform employment protection legislation so as ‘to reduce over-protection of workers with 
permanent contracts, and provide protection to those left outside or at the margins of the job 
market’.26 With the stated aim of better ‘balancing’ the legal protection afforded to so-called 
insiders and outsiders, national governments have amended legislation so as to weaken the 
rights and lower the standards enjoyed by the former, without in fact strengthening the 
protections afforded to the latter.27 Elsewhere, conflicts of interest have been deemed to arise 
between ‘hard-working families’ and ‘welfare-scroungers’, ‘strivers’ and ‘shirkers’, and used 
to legitimise cuts to welfare.28 In an attempt to explain the imposition of draconian 
restrictions upon the right to strike, the interests of striking workers have been said to conflict 
with those of other worker-consumers, whose access to services is purportedly unfairly 
hindered by reason of the industrial action.29 
 
The figment of conflicts of interests between workers also loomed large, of course, in 
policy debates and print media in the run up to the 2016 Brexit referendum, and the Trump 
presidential campaign of the same year. Here, it took the form of the putative competition for 
jobs (and access to public services) arising between ‘British’, or ‘American’, and immigrant 
workers. In both cases, then, the ‘villains’ of the piece were the outsiders rather than the 
                                                          
24 See eg the Kok Report, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs.  Creating more Employment in Europe (Report of the Employment 
Taskforce, November 2003), cited De Stefano, ‘Oversimplification’ 258. 
25 The term ‘Troika’ is widely used to refer to the EU Commission, European Central Bank, and International 
Monetary Fund acting together. 
26 EU Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions, Annual Growth Survey’ COM (2011) aa final. 
27 De Stefano, ‘Oversimplification’ 264-74. For an assessment of such reforms see (2016) 32(4) European 
Sociological Review, special issue  
28 See eg the Conservative Party of the UK, Manifesto 2015, and its bracketing together of welfare cuts and 
income tax cuts.  
29 UK Government, Department of Business Innovation and Skills, Trade Union Bill: Consultation on Ballot 
Thresholds in Important Public Services (July 2015). 
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insiders; in both cases, the language and imagery used was routinely exaggerated and even 
inflammatory. Take, for example, Leave.EU’s notorious ‘Breaking Point’ poster, with its 
depiction of a snaking queue of hundreds of dark skinned people, waiting – so we were 
clearly intended to understand – to gain entry to the country;30 or the almost daily headlines 
in The Sun, the Daily Express, and the Daily Mail, referring to the ‘hordes’ of immigrants 
squeezing into ‘full-up’ Britain, at the insistence of the EU.31 ‘MILLIONS of EU migrants 
grab our jobs: Time for Brexit to FINALLY take control of borders’ was fairly typical of the 
time, with its suggestion of a direct conflict of interest over work, and Brexit as the 
mechanism that would allow us to stem the immigrant flow.32 After the event, analysis 
suggested that these narratives had been influential: immigration was one of the main issues 
to influence Leave voters’ decision-making; moreover, that readers of the Sun, the Express 
and the Mail were much more likely to vote Leave than Remain.33  
 
 
C. Conflicts of Interest Depicted in Scholarship 
 
In scholarly writing, the language of labour market insiders and outsiders is familiar, first and 
foremost, from the US and a line of analysis in the law and economics tradition which seeks 
to illustrate the allegedly damaging effects of trade union representation; particularly, the 
barriers put in the way of employers who would otherwise ‘increase efficiency’ by hiring 
cheaper, non-union labour.34 In recent years, it has appeared, too, in the work of some left-
wing, or centre left, commentators. Perhaps the best-known example is Guy Standing and his 
identification of an emerging global class of low-paid workers with little or no job security: 
the ‘precariat’.35 As the dynamics of globalisation and government policies aimed at 
‘flexibilisation’ have fragmented older class divisions, so Standing argues, several new social 
classes have emerged, which may be defined with reference, essentially, to the degree of 
vulnerability suffered by their members. Above the ‘precariat’, sit then, among other classes, 
                                                          
30 Leave.EU is an organisation that campaigned for Leave during the 2016 Referendum. The poster in question 
is reproduced here: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-
point-poster-queue-of-migrants  
31 J Martinson, The Guardian, 24 June 2016. 
32 The headline is taken from the Daily Express, 18 February, 2016. 
33 K Swales, NatCen Report: Understanding the Leave Vote (NatCen Social Research 2016). At the time of 
writing, similar analysis of the 2016 US presidential election has yet to be published. 
34 De Stefano, ‘Oversimplification’ 262-4. 
35 G Standing, The Precariat: the New Dangerous Class (London 2011).  For criticism, see J Breman, ‘A Bogus 
Concept?’ (2013) 84 New Left Review 130. 
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the ‘salariat’ (comprising those employed in large corporations and government 
administration on a full-time basis, enjoying job-security, pensions and paid holidays) and the 
rump of the old working class (also employed under full-time, long-term contracts, enjoying 
both legal protections and representation by trade unions). Below it, sit the unemployed and 
the Lumpen. Implicit, and at times even explicit, in Standing’s analysis is the suggestion that 
the interests of these different classes of worker conflict. From a social policy/basic income 
group perspective, for example, he describes current systems of welfare and labour law as 
‘labourist’, effective only in supporting the shrinking and privileged population who are in 
stable and secure jobs. The centre-left must abandon the interests of ‘labour’, he argues, and 
turn its attentions instead to representation of the precariat. 
 
In the field of labour law more specifically, several important works have focused in 
recent years on the question of inter-worker conflicts: by Valerio de Stefano, for example, 
already cited above, analysing the centrality of the notion of labour market segmentation to 
‘mainstream responses’ to the financial crisis in the EU; by Guy Mundlak, and by ACL 
Davies.36 Both Mundlak and Davies have sought in their writing to make the case for the 
importance of inter-worker conflicts; Mundlak arguing that they ought to be paid greater 
attention by policy-makers and scholars alike, Davies building on that argument to consider 
how the law addresses such conflicts in the UK, and to begin the task of mapping out the 
law’s various responses. In the course of his analysis, Mundlak has made the provocative 
claim that conflicts of interest between different workers or groups of workers are of the 
same ‘order’ as the conflict between labour and capital.37   
[T]he question labour scholars and practitioners often ask – who gains from any 
particular arrangement, employers or workers? – must be complemented by its 
counterpart – which workers gain and which lose? Sacrificing the interests of some 
workers for the benefit of ‘labour’ as a group is but one option, but clearly not the 
only one, nor necessarily the most redeeming, even if recognizing the gains and losses 
of some groups risks the size of the aggregate gain, or labour’s gain.38 
                                                          
36 De Stefano, ‘Oversimplification’; G Mundlak, ‘The Third Function of Labour Law: Distributing Labour 
Market Opportunities among Workers’ in G Davidov and B Langille, The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford 2011); 
ACL Davies, ‘Identifying ‘Exploitative Compromises’: the Role of Labour Law in Resolving Disputes Between 
Workers’ (2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 269-94. See also J Rubery, ‘Reregulating for Inclusive Labour 
Markets’ Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 65 (Geneva: ILO, 2015) and further references 
contained therein. 
37 Mundlak, ‘Third Function’ 323 
38 Mundlak, ‘Third Function’ 328 
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III An Outline Critique 
 
The interests of individual workers and groups of workers can, of course, conflict. 
Competition between workers for jobs is as much a characteristic of market economies as 
conflict between workers and their employers over terms and conditions,39 and the greater the 
inequality of rewards attached to particular jobs – within and between different countries – 
the more accentuated such competition is likely to be. Conflicts of interest can arise then, for 
example, between applicants for the same post, or between workers in a particular sector and 
others (eg young people, migrants) who would willingly do the same jobs for less. It is also 
manifestly the case that law can serve to intensify or to weaken such conflicts of interest, or 
to resolve them in favour of particular parties.40 It can create mandatory minimum terms and 
conditions of employment, for example, applicable across whole localities or whole sectors.  
It can extend such minima to casual and migrant workers. It can guarantee a particular level 
of welfare to the unemployed. It can seek to prohibit discriminatory treatment of workers by 
employers on the grounds of race, gender or sexuality. In a situation of redundancies, it can 
stipulate the manner of redundancy selection. Which workers or groups of workers stand to 
benefit, and which to be disadvantaged, by particular labour laws is or should be a matter of 
concern to all scholars and policy-makers working in the field.41 
  
I want to suggest that it is nonetheless the case that approaches to the description or 
analysis of labour laws and labour markets which begin from an identification of conflicts of 
interests between workers – including, especially, those which employ the notion of insiders 
and outsiders as a heuristic device – can suffer from a number of weaknesses. Often, such 
approaches make use of the kind of microeconomic model which provides only an atemporal, 
spatially limited ‘snapshot’ of a single workplace or locality, from which the likely 
                                                          
39 Characterised by Max Weber as ‘Konkurrenzkampf’ and ‘Preiskampf’: M Weber, Economy and Society 
(Berkeley 1978) 72, 82, 93. Cf Kahn-Freund’s identification of ‘universal’ conflicts of interest between 
management and labour in P Davies and M Freedland (eds), Kahn-Freund’s Labour and the Law, 3rd ed. 
(London, Stevens, 1983). 
40 Davies, ‘Exploitative Compromises’; Mundlak, ‘Third Function’ 
41 Davies, ‘Exploitative Compromises’; Mundlak, ‘Third Function’. C Costello and M Freedland, ‘Migrants at 
Work and the Division of Labour Law’ in Costello and Freedland (eds), Migrants at Work (Oxford, OUP, 
2014). 
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consequences of particular actions or events must be deduced. The use of such models can 
encourage analysts into making a number of assumptions: for example, that the amount of 
resources to be distributed between workers in any given situation – (good) jobs, wages, 
rights, risks – is fixed, so that if one worker secures a job, or a higher wage, or a right to take 
time off to care for dependants, another will necessarily miss out on those things. The 
disadvantage suffered by the outsider can accordingly be attributed directly to the advantage 
enjoyed by the insider.42 Membership of posited ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ groups of workers is 
similarly often assumed to be fixed rather than fluid – the unemployed will remain 
unemployed, while those in full-time, stable employment stay in full-time, stable 
employment. ‘Labour’ is assumed to be a homogeneous good, the labour of one person to be 
always easily replaceable with that of another. 
 
Reintroducing a temporal and spatial dimension to the picture reveals that such 
assumptions may be unfounded. While it may be possible, in any given context, to establish 
that resources are fixed – so that a particular employer could not afford to hire extra staff 
without cutting the wages of existing employees; or so that the employment of an influx of 
migrant workers would necessarily entail the redundancy of others – this is not something 
that ought, without investigation, to be assumed. It might just as easily be the case that hiring 
extra staff would be economically viable for a particular firm because it would allow it to 
increase its customer base; that the employment of migrant workers would contribute to the 
growth of the economy and the creation of more jobs. Those who assume that resources are 
fixed overlook the fact that future resources are not; that action taken today may serve to 
increase, as well as to decrease, the quantity of resources available at a later date. 
Categorising workers as either insiders or outsiders, meanwhile, can tend to obscure not only 
the potentially temporary nature of membership of the posited groups, but also the possibility 
and the extent of shared interests between them. Workers in low-paid, insecure work may 
aspire to better jobs with better terms and conditions, and for that reason may not regard it as 
in their interests for systems of worker protection to be dismantled. Lowering the wages of 
one group of workers may impact negatively on the wages of others, and may additionally 
serve to legitimate cuts to welfare (on the basis that income tax revenue has fallen, or so as to 
                                                          
42 See for example Mundlak, ‘Third Function’ 323-4: ‘those who pay the price to the benefit of others’; Davies, 
‘Exploitative Compromises’, 270: ‘the introduction of the statutory right to request flexible working can be seen 
as a choice in favour of a particular group of workers – those with caring responsibilities – and against those 
who might want the benefit of flexible working for other reasons’. 
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ensure that ‘work pays’). Many ‘outsiders’ share directly the interests of ‘insiders’ by reason 
of being partially financially dependent on an ‘insider’ family member. Regarding labour as 
homogeneous and workers as readily interchangeable overlooks the existence of many 
different segments or groupings in labour markets, arising not only by reason of the differing 
terms and conditions of workers, but also different skill-sets and levels of education, 
geographical locations, corporate structures, trade union membership and so on.43  
 
A further significant weakness of the insider/outsider heuristic is its tendency to 
obscure the importance of employer interests and strategies in causing market segmentation. 
The very language of insiders and outsiders can appear to attribute the causes of inequalities 
among workers to the insiders (and not to capital or the state), and, as a consequence, to 
legitimise measures which aim to achieve greater equality by a process of levelling wages 
and conditions down. It is true that the lowering of insiders’ terms and conditions is not the 
only possible policy response to a diagnosis of dual segmentation. As Deakin has identified, a 
number of alternative strategies exist, including ‘mandating equal (or pro rata) protections for 
workers in atypical work relationships to those in the ‘core’ (‘levelling up’)’; widening the 
scope of labour law protections so as to increase the proportion of workers who enjoy them; 
and using the law ‘to stimulate alternative mechanisms of labour market regulation’ such as 
‘collective bargaining, training policy and fiscal incentives’.44 In the current context of 
austerity, however, and in line with the economic orthodoxy regarding the benefits of ever-
greater flexibility, it is levelling-down which is almost invariably the preferred option of 
national governments and supranational institutions. The aim is decidedly to increase the 
number of jobs, and not to ensure their quality. 
 
As was emphasised long ago by Engels, employers have much to gain by 
orchestrating and intensifying competition between workers.45 It was, of course, precisely for 
that reason that workers sought to organise themselves into trade unions and to demand the 
standardisation of terms and conditions across whole sectors and countries, or regions, 
refusing to compete with one another on the basis of the price at which they were willing to 
                                                          
43 W Streeck, ‘The Sociology of Labor Markets and Trade Unions’ in N J Smelser and R Swedberg (eds), The 
Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton 2005). 
44 S Deakin, ‘Addressing Labour Market Segmentation: the Role of Labour Law’ Working Paper No. 52, 
Governance and Tripartism Department (Geneva 2013) 
45 ‘[C]ompetition of the workers among themselves is … the sharpest weapon against the proletariat in the hands 
of the bourgeoisie.’ F Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (Leipzig: Otto Wigand, 1845. 
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sell their labour power. Those who advocate labour market ‘flexibilisation’ as a response to 
the existence of insiders and outsiders seem to overlook this point; to downplay the fact that 
some forms of flexibilisation – eg the dismantling of established machinery for the collective 
representation of workers’ interests – may serve to increase inequalities between workers, 
intensifying competition between them for (the better) jobs.46 This is not true across the 
board, of course: certain types of labour market segmentation may serve the interests of 
employing organisations not only by keeping wages low, but also by weakening the capacity 
of labour for collective action.47 The reorganisation of big firms in line with a core/periphery 
pattern, for example, may be undertaken with the specific aim of reducing labour costs, 
divesting the firm of non-core elements of the production process, and creating a two-tier 
workforce in the process. Inequalities between remaining ‘core’ employees and the rest – the 
employees of smaller contractors, ‘zero hours’ and other ‘casual’ workers, self-employed 
workers – are likely to be significant.   
 
 
IV Case Study 
 
A. The Agricultural Sector in Scotland 
 
In what follows, the aim is to give further consideration to the nature and implications of 
conflicts of interest in the field of work and labour market relations, focusing specifically on 
the agriculture sector in Scotland. In economic terms, the sector is small, accounting for only 
around 1 per cent of income and 1 per cent of jobs in Scotland.48 In terms of its workforce, it 
is characterised by low pay across the board, and by a singularly high proportion of 
temporary migrant labour.49 In 2010, it was estimated that as many as half of all employees in 
the sector were ‘A8’ migrants, from the eight Central and Eastern European countries that 
                                                          
46 This is especially likely to be the case where the collective bargaining machinery previously in place was 
sectoral rather than company specific: De Stefano 271-4; Rubery cites evidence that deregulation can serve to 
increase the dispersion of employment conditions and rewards: Rubery, 6 
47 Breman, New Left Review 
48 The reference here to ‘jobs’ indicates that ‘working occupiers’ and ‘working spouses’ are excluded from the 
calculation, since they are generally treated as unpaid labour. Scottish Government, Economic Report on 
Scottish Agriculture, 2016 Edition (Edinburgh 2016); Scottish Government, Regional Employment Patterns in 
Scotland: Statistics from the Annual Population Survey 2015 (Edinburgh 2016) 
49 In April 2013, median full-time gross weekly earnings in agriculture in the UK were found to be £407.50, 
21.3% lower than the median for all industries and services, £517.50: D Bovill, Office for National Statistics, 
Patterns of Pay: Estimates from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings, UK, 1997 to 2013 (London 2014) 
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acceded to the EU on 1 May 2004.50 This was a much larger proportion of the workforce than 
in any other sector in Scotland.51 Between 1998 and 2008, the number of full-time employees 
in agriculture decreased by around 4000, while the number of casual and temporary workers 
increased by around 2000.52 Full-time employees now constitute only around half of the 
workforce, the other half being part-time, casual and seasonal workers, with migrants 
providing much of the seasonal labour.53  
 
In Scotland, as elsewhere, employment in the agricultural sector possesses certain 
features which can tend to make the situation of workers particularly precarious.54 Much of 
the work is seasonal, leaving workers without a stable, guaranteed income throughout the 
year. Where they are only in post for short periods of time, workers are less likely to have 
been given proper health and safety information and training, or to have acquired the same 
level of expertise in using farm machinery as permanent employees, putting them at an even 
greater risk than usual of workplace accidents.55 Often, agricultural work requires to be done 
in geographically isolated locations, meaning that farm workers are reliant on the 
accommodation and/or transport provided by their employer, with only very limited 
opportunities to seek advice, including legal advice, or to join a trade union. By reason of 
these various vulnerabilities, workers in agriculture may be more likely than others to accept 
any terms offered in a bid to get themselves hired, and less likely to be in a position to 
enforce their legal rights. Migrant workers may not be able to build up the periods of long-
term continuous residence necessary to acquire more secure residence status. According to 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission, there is some evidence in the Scottish 
agricultural sector of human trafficking and forced labour.56 The wages of migrant workers 
employed to plant and harvest soft fruit in Scotland, it has found, may be below the minimum 
wage.57  
                                                          
50 Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. A Findlay, A Geddes, D 
McCollum, ‘International Migration and Recession’ (2010) International 
Migration and Recession’ (2010) 126(4) Scottish Geographical Journal 299-320, 314. No Government statistics 
are available as to numbers of migrant workers employed across the sector. 
51 Ibid.  
52 Findlay et al, ‘International Migration’, 316 
53 Scottish Gov Report 2016: 
54 Davies, ‘Migrant Workers’, 80-1 
55 Health and Safety Executive, Fatal injuries in farming, horticulture and fish farming in Scotland from 
2003/04 to 2013/14 (HSE 2014) 
56 Equality and Human Rights Commission Scotland, Inquiry into Human Trafficking in Scotland Report 
(Equality and Human Rights Commission 2011), 8 
57 Ibid. 
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[T]hey can lose significant parts of what they earn in commission to the gangmaster, 
as well as repaying exorbitant charges for being conscripted and brought in. They may 
also be charged for living accommodation in insanitary, dangerous portakabins in the 
countryside, crammed to the seams with other workers.58 
 
From 1943 until the end of 2013, the hiring of temporary migrant labour in agriculture 
across the UK was regulated by a series of temporary migrant worker programmes.59 Most 
recently, the so-called Seasonal Agricultural Workers Programme accommodated as many as 
25,000 workers per annum in the country, employed primarily in horticulture at harvest 
time.60 From 2008, the Programme was limited to so-called A2 nationals, from Romania and 
Bulgaria.61 It was brought to an end on 1 January 2014 to coincide with the lifting of 
restrictions on the rights of A2 nationals to work in the UK. Since then, the demand for 
seasonal workers in agriculture has been filled predominantly by A8 and A2 nationals who, 
as EU citizens, do not require a visa to work in the UK. This is consistent with Government 
policy that demand for unskilled and low skilled labour should be satisfied, for the moment, 
from within the EU.62  
 
Since the beginning of 2014, then, no distinction has been drawn in law between 
temporary migrant and other kinds of agricultural labour when it comes to the regulation of 
workers’ terms and conditions of employment. In Scotland, two separate and very different 
regulatory regimes are in force, in addition to the generally applicable norms of employment 
law: the Scottish Agricultural Wages Board (SAWB) and the Gangmasters Labour Abuse 
Authority (GLAA, formerly the Gangmasters Licensing Authority).63 The SAWB is 
empowered by statute to set wages and other terms and conditions for the sector by way of 
statutory order.64 Together with the Agricultural Advisory Panel for Wales, it is the sole 
survivor of a system of wages councils first set up under the Trade Boards Act 1909, the 
                                                          
58 Ibid. 
59 S Scott, ‘Making the case for Temporary Migrant Worker Programmes: Evidence from the UK's rural 
guestworker (‘SAWS’) scheme’ (2015) 40 Journal of Rural Studies 1-11 
60 At its 2004 peak: ibid. For an outline of the relevant rules, see ACL Davies, ‘Migrant Workers in Agriculture’ 
in C Costello and M Freedland (eds), Migrants at Work: Immigration and Vulnerability in Labour Law (Oxford 
2014) 
61 The A2 countries are Romania and Bulgaria which joined the EU on1 January, 2007. The access of A2 
nationals to the UK labour market was restricted until January 2014. 
62 Scott 
63 The Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales was abolished in 2013. 
64 Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Act 1949 
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remainder of which were abolished during the 1980s, and, in the case of the Agricultural 
Wages Board for England and Wales, in 2013.65 The original aim of the trade boards 
legislation was to create a legislative substitute for collective machinery, involving 
representatives of labour and the employers directly in the setting of wages.66 In line with that 
aim, the SAWB comprises 17 members: six nominated by Unite the Union, six nominated by 
the National Farmers Union Scotland and the Scottish Land and Estates, and five independent 
members appointed by Scottish Ministers. Its annual Wages Orders apply to all employees in 
the sector, guaranteeing them an hourly wage that is at least as high as the National Living or 
Minimum Wage (NLW/NMW) and in many cases higher, depending on the length of service 
and qualifications of the employee in question.67 It also sets additional overtime rates, 
minimum paid holiday entitlements that are more generous than the generally applicable 
minima established under the Working Time Regulations, and other rules, including a 
requirement that employees be supplied by their employer with weather protective clothing 
and boots.68 Enforcement of the rules contained in the Order is a matter for the Scottish 
Government Wages Enforcement Team, and the Agricultural Wages Inspector.69 
 
The GLAA was first established in 2006 with the aim of protecting vulnerable and 
exploited workers in the agriculture, horticulture, shellfish gathering and associated 
processing and packaging sectors throughout the UK.70 Because its method of seeking to 
achieve this aim involves operating a ‘gangmaster’ – or labour provider – licensing regime, it 
has no application to individuals who are employed directly by farm businesses. Under the 
terms of the relevant legislation, any labour provider must apply for and continue to hold a 
licence in order to operate lawfully in the relevant sectors. Before granting a licence, the 
                                                          
65 The Trade Boards Act 1909 was amended by the Trade Boards Act 1918. The Wages Councils Act 1945 
repealed the two earlier Acts in their entirety and replaced them with a new set of provisions. In agriculture, a 
Wages Bard was first established under the Corn Production Act 1917. The Agricultural Advisory Panel for 
Wales was established under the Agricultural Sector (Wales) Act 2014. 
66 As discussed by Otto Kahn-Freund in O Kahn-Freund, ‘Legal Framework’ in A Flanders and HA Clegg (eds), 
The System of Industrial Relations in Great Britain (Oxford 1954), 69 
67 The Order uses the term ‘worker’ throughout but confines its application to workers ‘employed’ in 
agriculture: Agricultural Wages (Scotland) Order (No. 63) 2015 [AWSO], Art 3. An employee with at least 26 
weeks continuous service is entitled to a higher hourly minimum, as is an employee with certain agricultural 
qualifications: AWSO, Arts 5, 6, 8 
68 AWSO, Arts 9, 10, 27 
69 Scottish Agricultural Wages Board, Annual Report for 1 October 2015 – 30 September 2016: 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/farmingrural/Rural/business/18107/SAWBAnnualReport2016  
70 Gangmasters (Licensing) Act 2004, since amended by the Immigration Act 2016. The types of agriculture and 
associated industry covered by the Act are stipulated in s. 3. In the 2016 Act, provision has been made for the 
future extension of the GLAA’s remit to cover all sectors of the labour market: s 3(5) GLA, as amended.   
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Authority must inspect the applicant; where the business is new and not yet trading, it may 
return after granting the licence for a second inspection. The matter of whether to award or 
revoke a licence is judged by the GLAA with reference to eight labour standards, the majority 
of which seek to protect workers from exploitation and abuse, to ensure that they enjoy safe 
and decent working conditions, and to ensure a floor of basic rights.71 Responsibility for 
monitoring and enforcement lies primarily with the GLAA. Where a gangmaster breaches a 
term of its licence, the GLAA may revoke the licence, or modify it.72 It is a criminal offence 
to operate as a gangmaster without a licence, or to use labour from an unlicensed provider.73  
 
In contrast to the Scottish Agricultural Wages legislation, the Gangmasters 
(Licensing) Act makes no provision for the setting of wages or other terms and conditions 
higher than those already stipulated as the NLW/NMW or by the Agricultural Wages Order. 
Instead, its ‘added value’ lies principally with the additional degree of scrutiny it ensures of 
labour provision practices in the sector, and of the terms and conditions of employment, and 
working and living conditions of the relevant workers. A second strength of the regime is its 
broad scope of application. Both gangmaster and ‘worker’ are defined very widely in the Act 
so as to include all workers provided by a gangmaster (whether an individual or agency, 
situated in the UK or elsewhere) or other intermediary, including those workers who have no 
contract of employment or ‘workers’ contract, and/or ‘no right to be, or to work’ in the UK.74 
The licensing system thus extends a number of employment rights, albeit indirectly, to 
workers who might not otherwise have had them – including the right to be paid a national 
minimum.75 In operation for over a decade now, the Authority has been widely and highly 
praised for clamping down on rogue employers and preventing abusive practices.76 Since 
                                                          
71 Gangmasters (Licensing Conditions) Rules 2009, SI 2009/307, Schedule 1. For explanation, see GLA, 
Licensing Standards (May 2012, reprinted July 2015), available: http://www.gla.gov.uk/media/2745/licensing-
standards-aug-2016.pdf  
72 GLA, s 9 
73 GLA, ss 12 and 13 
74 GLA, ss. 3 and 4  
75 See ‘Licensing Standard 2’: ‘A worker must be paid at least the National Minimum Wage (NMW) or, if 
applicable, in accordance with appropriate Agricultural Wages Order (AWO)… Failure against this standard 
will lead to the licence being revoked without immediate effect.’ I say ‘indirectly’, because the Act does not 
actually confer any rights on workers, but instead deems the paying of stipulated wages etc to be a ‘licensing 
condition’.   
76 See eg Frances O’Grady quoted in TUC press release, TUC raises concerns over changes to the Gangmasters 
Licensing Authority, 12 January 2016; A Balch, P Brindley, A Geddes, S Scott, Gangmasters Licensing 
Authority: Annual Review 2008 (GLA 2009); M Wilkinson, G Craig, A Gaus, Forced Labour in the UK and the 
GLA (Hull University 2010. For a discussion of current threats to the continued effectiveness of the GLAA, see 
ACL Davies, ‘The Immigration Act 2016’ (2016) 45(3) Industrial Law Journal 431-42 
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2010, significant budget cuts have raised a question mark over its continued capacity to 
function as effectively as it did in its first years.77 
 
 
B. Agricultural Insiders and Outsiders?  
 
On the face of it, then, the agricultural sector in Scotland comprises a variety of different 
groups of workers which could be thought of as comprising ‘insiders’ or ‘outsiders’: 
employees whose terms and conditions are regulated by the SAWB, and casual workers, to 
whom the relevant rules do not apply; local workers, and migrants from within the EU and 
elsewhere; workers employed directly by farmers, and those supplied to the farmers by labour 
market intermediaries or gangmasters; the documented, and the undocumented. Categorising 
the workers in this way might prompt us to consider such questions as the following. In 
commanding higher wages than the national minimum by reason of the Scottish Agricultural 
Wages Order, are employees eating up an unnecessarily large portion of employers’ budgets? 
Are they thereby preventing the hire of potentially greater numbers of (cheaper) casual and 
gangmaster-supplied workers? With their readiness to accept lower wages and harsher terms 
and conditions, are temporary migrant workers undercutting Scottish workers, and filling 
vacancies that would otherwise be filled by the locals? If, as a consequence of Brexit, EU 
workers were no longer able to work here without visas, causing labour shortages in the 
sector, would Scottish workers step forward to take up the jobs as they became available? 
Would employers offer higher wages in an effort to persuade them to do so? 
 
The sketch of the sector drawn above principally comprises information regarding 
working relationships and the relevant regulatory regimes. If we supplement it with 
consideration of employer motivations and practices, it changes dramatically so that quite 
different questions appear to require answers. A useful example of such an employer- or 
demand-side-focused analysis is provided by Ben Rogaly in his study of horticulture in the 
UK.78 Rogaly takes as his starting point the observation that it is harder, as a general rule, to 
                                                          
77 Davies, ‘Migrant Workers’; Davies ‘Immigration Act’ 
78 B Rogaly, ‘Intensification of Workplace Regimes in British Agriculture: The Role of Migrant Workers’ 
(2008) 14 Population, Place Space 497-510. Rogaly approves Krissman’s arguments regarding the need for 
more demand-side-focused analyses of migration: Rogaly, 499 citing F Krissman ‘Sin coyote ni patron: why the 
‘migrant network’ fails to explain international migration’ (2005) 39 International Migration Review 4–44. 
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make a profit in agriculture than in many other sectors. As Marx long ago observed, 
production time and labour time are not identical in agriculture, so that there are necessarily 
periods of idleness of labour and machinery, with consequent stalling of the turnover of 
capital.79 In recent years, Rogaly goes on to explain, these basic difficulties have been 
compounded by the ever-growing power of supermarkets as the main buyers of horticultural 
produce, and their ability to appropriate ever-greater value from the producers.80 In an effort 
to turn a profit nonetheless, producers have sought to intensify production in a variety of 
ways. Here, Rogaly adopts the broad definition of ‘intensification’ proposed by Guthman to 
include not only ‘efforts to speed up, enhance or reduce the risks of biological processes’, but 
also ‘some nontechnical innovations in labour control … for example, the use of vulnerability 
to ensure a timely and compliant labour force come harvesttime’.81 In British horticulture, he 
observes three examples of trends in employment practices which may be understood to 
indicate such intensification: the increased employment of international migrant workers, the 
increased use of gangmaster labour, and the increased use of piece rates. On the basis of three 
case studies, he concludes that the drive towards intensification ‘has been caused largely by 
corporate retailers’ regulation of workplace regimes in the sector, through their requirements 
for volume, ‘quality’ and low margins for the growers’.82 
 
Of course, the oligopsony power of supermarkets is not only an issue for horticultural 
producers.83 In her 2004 exposé of the supermarket sector, the food writer and journalist 
Joanna Blythman likened the relationship between retailers and producers to that of masters 
and servants.84 Producers are beholden to supermarkets for the simple reason that they have 
no one else, often, to sell to.85 In their relations with individual producers, supermarkets 
capitalise on their position of power by wielding the threat of ‘delisting’ ie ceasing to buy 
                                                          
79 Rogaly, ‘Intensification’, 498, citing S Mann, Agrarian Capitalism in Theory and Practice (University of 
North Carolina Press 1990) 
80 Rogaly, ‘Intensification’, 499, citing Competition Commission, Supermarkets: a Report on the Supply of 
Groceries from Multiple Stores in the United Kingdom (London 2000) 
81 Rogaly, ‘Intensification’, 498, citing J Guthman, Agrarian Dreams: The Paradox of Organic Farming in 
California. (University of 
California Press 2004) 
82 Rogaly, ‘Intensification’, 506 
83 J Blythman, Shopped:The Shocking Power of British Supermarkets (Harper Perennial 2005); Rogaly, 
‘Intensification’ 
84 Blythman, Shopped, 177 
85 In 2011, supermarkets in the UK were estimated to command 76% of the supply of food products to 
consumers: P Shears, ‘Grocery Suppliers Code of Practice: Fairness for Farmers?’ (2013) 3 International 
Journal of Agricultural Management 59 
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from that producer.86 At the same time as they present the producer with a list of incredibly 
detailed product specifications (stipulating precisely the size, shape, colour and general 
appearance of the items to be supplied), they refuse, as a rule, to make any binding 
commitment to purchase from that producer, then, or for any period of time to come.87 Nor 
will they undertake to provide a minimum period of notice before cancelling an order.88 In 
tailoring its produce, as it must, to comply with the supermarket’s wishes, meanwhile, the 
producer becomes even more reliant on that specific buyer, since others will likely have 
different product specifications. As documented by the Competition Commission in 2000, the 
variety of ways in which supermarkets routinely abuse their resultant positions of power is 
quite startling: not only squeezing the price that they will pay for goods, for example, but 
actually requiring producers to pay them, in various ways, in return for stocking or promoting 
the producers’ food and drink.89 
 
In the Scottish agricultural sector, as elsewhere, the oligopsony power of the 
supermarkets is reflected above all in the very low profit margins of the majority of 
commercial farms, and in the high proportion of such farms reliant on subsidies.90 As a result 
of efforts to intensify production, wages have been driven down and working practices 
amended so that it has become increasingly difficult for employers to recruit local workers.91 
Migrant workers fulfil a ‘complementary’ rather than ‘substitutional’ workforce function, 
performing work that would not otherwise be done by locals.92 In the light of these findings, 
the question that begs to be answered is not so much one of conflicts of interest between 
different worker groups, but rather that of the potentially disastrous consequences of Brexit 
for the sector. As was noted above, more than half of all workers in the sector are currently 
thought to be EU citizens exercising their freedom of movement. Evidence suggests that they 
could not be replaced with Scottish or British workers, at least, not without a rise in wages of 
a magnitude that could threaten the viability of many producers, for example, if supermarkets 
                                                          
86 Blythman, Shopped, ch 18 
87 ibid, ch 27 
88 ibid, ch 22 
89 Competition Commission Report 2000 
90 According to Government figures, in 2014/15 average farm business income, including from subsidies, was 
only £23,000. Excluding support from grants and subsidies, the average farm made a loss of £17,000 in 2014: 
Scottish Government, Economic Report.  
91 Findlay et al, ‘International Migration’, 316-7 
92 ibid, 313 
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chose to buy imports instead.93 If the demand for cheap, exploitable labour cannot otherwise 
be filled, however, the threat arises of increased incidences of undocumented work, 
trafficking and forced labour.94  
 
As to the role of government in all of this, Rogaly has highlighted the interest which 
the state has in reducing food prices, and retail price inflation more generally.95 In furtherance 
of that interest, successive governments have offered all kinds of support to supermarkets 
since the end of the second world war: from the funding of trips for the directors of Tesco and 
Sainsbury to study emerging multiple grocery stores in the United States, to the abolition of 
the retail price mechanism in 1964.96 In 2001, the Labour Government responded to the 2000 
Report of the Competition Commission, which had recognised the frequent abuses by 
supermarkets of their positions of power, by issuing a Supermarkets Code of Practice.97 
Voluntary rather than binding in nature, and reliant upon individual producers brave enough 
to bring complaints against the retail giants, however, the Code was widely criticised for its 
ineffectualness.98  
 
In 2010, the Coalition Government introduced a new Grocery Suppliers Code of 
Practice which, since 2013, has its own Groceries Code Adjudicator.99 Under the terms of the 
relevant legislation, the Adjudicator is authorised to arbitrate disputes between retailers and 
suppliers, investigate complaints from suppliers, and where there has been a breach of the 
Code, to publish that information and/or to impose a fine.100 Importantly, the Adjudicator 
may rely on evidence from third parties in deciding whether to launch an investigation, and 
need not therefore wait for a plucky producer willing to raise her head above the parapet. 
These are positive developments indeed, which have already resulted in the public 
admonishing of Tesco for breaches of the Code relating to delayed payments.101 Whether the 
                                                          
93 Migration Advisory Committee, Report on Migrant Seasonal Workers, (UK Home Office 2013) 
94 With respect to forced labour, the Equality and Human Rights Commission Scotland have identified demand 
for cheap, exploitable labour as a pull factor to ‘destination’ countries: Equality and Human Rights Commission 
Scotland, Inquiry. 
95 Rogaly, ‘Intensification’, 507 
96 ibid, 506-7 
97 For discussion, see Blythman, Shopped, ch 24 
98 ibid; Shears, ‘Fairness for Farmers’, citing Office of Fair Trading, The Supermarkets Code of Practice: Report 
on the Review of the Operation of the Code of Practice (2004). 
99 https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/groceries-code-adjudicator 
100 Groceries Code Adjudicator Act 2013 
101 Groceries Code Adjudicator Annual Report 2015-16 
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Adjudicator is sufficiently resourced to make a significant and lasting difference to 
supermarket behaviour remains, however, to be seen.102 In this respect, it ought also to be 
borne in mind that the Code aims at ensuring ‘fair and lawful’ treatment of producers by 
retailers, and not at transforming the essential nature of their relationship across the sector.  
 
On the matter of Brexit, and the labour shortages that it will almost certainly bring 
with it, the Government has not undertaken, at the time of writing, to guarantee the right of 
EU citizens to continue working in this country; nor to introduce any kind of alternative 
temporary work visa scheme. In her speech to the annual conference of the National Farmers’ 
Union in February 2017, the Environment Secretary acknowledged the ‘vital role’ that 
seasonal migrants from the EU played, especially in horticulture, but was also quick to 
remind the audience that controlling immigration was a ‘key factor’ behind the vote to 
Leave.103 Labour shortages would best be avoided, then, she seemed to suggest, through 
encouraging British workers and apprentices into the sector, and through technological 
innovation. 
 
 
V Conclusion 
 
In policy discourse, the rhetoric of labour market insiders and outsiders is often deployed in 
support of measures aimed at weakening labour rights and protections, sometimes as part of a 
wider-ranging politics of division. As scholars of labour law, we ought always to be attentive 
to conflicts of interest between workers, and the ways in which law can accentuate, alleviate, 
or resolve these. We must be equally attentive, however, to the possibility that such conflicts 
have been overemphasised by government or other commentators, purported or assumed to 
exist where they may not. Where conflicts of interest between workers are overstated – as can 
be the case, in particular, where the notion of insiders and outsiders is used as a heuristic – 
the danger arises that the motivations and strategies of employing organisations, and the role 
of the state, might each be obscured. Workers might feel encouraged into the belief that 
legislative protections and collective institutions are not for them; as a consequence, support 
                                                          
102 In 2015-16, the single investigation into Tesco’s breach of the Code lasted almost a year from launch through 
to publication of the report, taking over 50% of the Adjudicator’s time and 25% of the total office resource: ibid. 
103 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/environment-secretary-speaks-at-nfu-conference, accessed 23 
February 2017 
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for the protective legislation and collective institutions in question might be weakened, and 
their efficacy undermined.104  
 
 
                                                          
104 S Marshall and C Fenwick, Labour Regulation and Development: Socio-Legal Perspectives (Elgar 2016) 
